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ABSTRACT 
Since 1945 there has been a noticeable broadening of what constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security. Traditionally, the definition of 
“threat to international peace” was limited to a conflict among nations, 
which were conflicts common in the world. 
 
The core threat to international peace used to be organized inter-state 
conflicts only. Today however, the nature of threats to international peace 
has changed drastically to include internal conflicts – as there are examples 
of cases where these have spread across the borders or have led to massive 
refugee situations. 
 
In this dissertation, I review the mandate of the United Nation’s inter alia 
the changing definition of ‘threat to international peace’. This work was 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters Degree in 
International Law (LLM) at the University of Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1945 there has been a noticeable broadening of what constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security.1 Traditionally, the definition of 
“threat to international peace” was limited to a conflict among nations 
which were conflicts common to the world.2 The core threat to 
international peace used to be organized inter-state conflict only. Today 
however, the nature of threats to international peace has changed 
drastically to include internal conflicts.3 
The High Level Panel defined a threat to international peace as; 
“Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life 
chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international 
system is a threat to international security.4” 
The panel listed six clusters of threats the world must take note of and 
among these were internal conflicts including civil war, genocide and other 
large-scale atrocities. Though the occurence of internal conflict and its 
consequences have been a huge concern of the United Nations, it was not 
until the end of the Cold War that the organization made and effort to 
address the situation.5 
This development was facilitated by the fact that the threat to human well-
being could not be confined to instances of interstate conflict alone and the 
realization that sovereignty could not continue to act as a shield for abusive 
                                                          
1 Weiss Thomas and Thakur Ramesh, Global Governance of the United Nation; An Unfinished Journey, (2010), 
75. 
2 Osterdahl Inger, Threat to the Peace, The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the United 
Nations Charter, (1998), 19. 
3 Chibundu Maxwell, “Defining Threats to Collective Security”, in Danchin Peter and Fischer Horst (eds), United 
Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (2010), 120. 
4 United Nations, Report of the High-Level Panel, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, (2004), 2. 
5 Andreopoulos George “Collective Security and the Responsibility to Protect”, in Danchin Peter and Fischer 
Horst (eds), United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (2010), 156.  
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conduct.6 The interdependence shared by nations also implies that a 
conflict that starts as an internal one may constitute a threat to 
neighbouring states and involve serious violations to fundamental human 
rights.7 
Today nations are interconnected as never before, as a result of which 
these threats are viewed collectively. Hence it is more effective for nations 
to pool their resources together and collectively address threats to 
international peace.8  
The cooperation of nations is essential to effectively tackle the 
international threats to peace and security and that is why the United 
Nations Charter in its preamble calls for the cooperation of all member 
states to unite in the interest of maintaining international peace and 
security. 
The Security Council is one of the organs of the United Nations, and has the 
responsibility to determine the existence of a threat to international peace 
and security and to take all necessary steps according to the powers 
granted it by the United Nations Charter under Chapter VII to prevent and 
remove all threats to the peace.  
The Council has the power under Chapter VII to restore peace both in 
international and internal conflicts.9 Hence once there is a threat to the 
                                                          
6Andreopoulos George “Collective Security and the Responsibility to Protect”, in Danchin Peter and Fischer 
Horst (eds), United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (2010), 157. 
7OsterdahlInger, Threat to the Peace, The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the United 
Nations Charter, (1998), 20. 
8 United Nations, Report of the High-Level Panel, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, (2004),2...  
9 Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. 
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peace the Security Council can take binding decisions irrespective of the 
fact that it is an internal conflict.10  
The Council has exercised its powers in Chapter VII to restore international 
peace and security both in international conflicts and internal conflicts. 
This dissertation will however focus on the internal conflicts that occurred 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. The conflicts started with the revolution 
in Tunisia. These conflicts dubbed the “Arab Spring, were based on a cry of 
the people demanding change from their governments. They wanted a 
change from the oppression, human rights violations, misrule and 
corruption which had been the order of the day for decades.11 
This thesis examines the role of the Council to maintain international peace 
and security with particular reference to the involvement of the Council in 
the Arab Spring conflicts. The Council’s actions were inconsistent in each of 
these revolutions as the revolutions themselves were different in character. 
In Tunisia and Egypt the conflict was not an armed conflict because the 
protesters didn’t form an armed rebellion hence the silence of the Council 
in these revolutions. However in Libya and Syria the Council declared the 
situation to be a threat to international peace and resolutions were passed 
to restore the peace.  
It is apparent that even though the Council has a power to restore peace 
and security, it has the discretion to choose when to act. Chapter one of this 
dissertation will analyse what informs the discretion of the Council by 
reviewing past resolutions where the Council had intervened in internal 
conflicts. This will give a well-informed analysis of why the Council didn’t 
                                                          
10 Rupesinghe Kumar, “Coping with Internal Conflicts: Teaching the Elephant to Dance”, Alger Chadwick (ed), in 
The Future of the United Nation’s System: Potential for the Twenty-First Century, (1998), 158. 
11 Amnesty International, Year of Rebellion the State of Human Rights In the Middle East and North Africa, 
(2012), 1, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE01/001/2012, accessed on 18th of April 2012 @ 
2:00pm.  
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act in Egypt and Tunisia. It is important to note that the Council may also be 
unable to act if its permanent members veto a resolution. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 SECURITY COUNCIL’S INFLUENCE IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 
 
The primary responsibility of the Council is the maintenance international 
peace and security.12 In achieving its responsibility the Council has the 
power to determine that a conflict constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security and to take necessary measures under Chapter VII of 
the Charter to remove such a threat.13 
Reviewing the resolutions of the Council it is obvious that not all internal 
conflicts constitute a threat to international peace and security. As is the 
case with the Arab Spring, which is the topic under discussion, the Council 
acted in Libya and Syria but did not take any action in Egypt and Tunisia. It 
is therefore apt to consider factors that the Council considers before it 
determines that an internal conflict actually constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security. 
In analysing the Council’s action, one cannot make reference to judicial 
review and case law because there is no supreme institution which can 
make a decision on the Council’s action or inaction. One can only analyse 
the various resolutions passed by the Council during internal conflicts in 
order to determine when an internal conflict constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security and hence warrants the action of the 
Council. This will give us a better understanding as to why, when and how 
the Council intervenes in internal conflicts. 
It is important to define the concept “internal armed” conflict. The primary 
responsibility to maintain law and order in a nation is that of the nation’s 
                                                          
12 Article 24 of the United Nations Charter. 
13 Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter. 
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government hence not all internal conflicts require the intervention from 
international organization like the Security Council. 
 Though the Addition Protocol II to the Geneva Convention did not 
specifically define the concept of internal armed conflict, it mentions 
instances that do not qualify as an internal armed conflict. 
Article 1(2) of the Protocol, states that situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other 
acts of a similar nature, are not armed conflicts. Therefore the Council will 
usually not interfere in such situations. 
1.2 INTERNAL CONFLICTS DETERMINED AS AN INTERNATIONAL THREATS TO PEACE 
 
Aspects of an internal conflict that constitutes a threat to peace can be 
deduced from the carefully worded preambles of each resolution where the 
conflicts are described.14 
Council has determined the existence of threat to peace in the internal 
conflicts in the following situations: 
 The denial of self-determination by a racist minority regime 
 General civil war 
 Apartheid  
 Seizure of power from a democratically elected government 
 Serious humanitarian crises15 
 Genocide 
                                                          
14 Osterdahl Inger, Threat to the Peace, The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the United 
Nations Charter, (1998), 80. 
15 Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, (2007), 92 
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1.2.1 The denial of self-determination by a racist minority regime 
 
In Southern Rhodesia, the Council condemned the forceful rule of a white 
minority over the black majority. 16  The Rhodesian Government, led by 
Prime Minister Ian Smith, announce a Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI), which was aimed at oppressing the black people (who 
constitute the majority of the population) by the white minority. 17 The 
Council recognized the inalienable right of the people of South Rhodesia to 
self-determination and independence. 
The Council determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia 
constituted a threat to international peace18 and in order to restore the 
peace, it imposed sanctions on the illegal regime which included arms 
embargo, an embargo on oil and petroleum products and asked member 
states to break off all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia.19 When 
the situation did not improve, the Council further imposed a trade 
embargo20 and authorized member states to use armed force to restore 
peace in the country.21 
1.2.2 General Civil War 
 
The Council had determined that civil war in some instances constituted 
not only a threat to the country where the war is raging but also a threat to 
the region and a threat to international peace and security. 
                                                          
16 Security Council Resolution 216, (1965). 
17http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/11/newsid_2658000/2658445.stm, accessed 
on the January 18th 2013 @ 7:28am. 
18 Security Council Resolution 221, (1966). 
19 Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 217, (1965). 
20Paragraph 2, Security Council Resolution 232, (1966). 
21 Paragraph 9, Security Council Resolution 253, (1968). 
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Yugoslavia was a federation made up of six republics- Serbia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The civil war 
broke out when Croatia and Slovenia decided to break loose from the 
federation. The war, which lasted from 1991 to 1995, was a complex one 
assuming different forms and involving different republics in the 
federation. 
Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia, which was causing a heavy 
loss of human life and material damage, and concerned that the 
continuation of this situation could constitute a threat to international 
peace and security the Council imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia.22 
The Council in a bid to maintain international peace and security 
established a United Nations Protection Force with the aim to create the 
conditions of peace and security required for negotiations of an overall 
settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia.23 It also placed an embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia 24, imposed 
trade embargos and froze all assets belonging to the Yugoslavian 
government within member state’s territory.25 
After Somalia’s long-standing military government, headed by Muhammed 
Siad Barre, was ousted in 1991, fighting and anarchy ensued. Inter clan and 
interfactional fighting flared up in Somalia leading to serious cases of 
murder, kidnapping, killing, internal displacement, starvation of thousands 
of Somalis and destabilization of the region. 26 
                                                          
22 Security Council Resolution 713, (1991). 
23 Security Council Resolution 743, ( 1992). 
24 Security Council Resolution 713, (1991). 
25 Security Council Resolution 752, (1992). 
26 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm, accessed on the 22nd January 2013 @ 
10:58pm. 
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The civil war in Somalia and its consequences were determined by the 
Council as constituting a threat to international peace and security. The 
council stated that it was “gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the 
situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread 
material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and aware of its 
consequences on the stability and peace in the region”.27 
To restore peace to the region the Council called for a UN humanitarian 
assistance28 and a cease-fire29 and also placed an arms embargo on 
Somalia.30 
The violence in Rwanda was also strongly condemned by the Council. War 
broke out in Rwanda among the Tutsis and the Hutus leading to the death 
of a large number of innocent civilians including children and women, 
displacement of a significant number of the Rwandese population and a 
significant increase in refugees to neighbouring countries.31 The Council 
described the situation as a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions.32 
In response to this conflict the Council demanded an immediate end of all 
forms of violence, expanded the mandate of the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a peace-keeping operation established by 
the Council in 1993, to include protection of displaced refugees; 
distribution of relief supplies and authority to use armed force when faced 
with violence.33 The Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter also 
imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda.34  
                                                          
27 Security Council Resolution 733, (1992). 
28 Paragraph 2, Security Council Resolution 733, (1992). 
29 Paragraph 4. Security Council Resolution 733, (1992). 
30 Paragraph 5, Security Council Resolution 733, (1992). 
31 Security Council Resolution 912 ,(1994). 
32 Security Council Resolution 918, (1994). 
33 Paragraph 3 -4, Security Council Resolution 918, (1994). 
34 Paragraph 13, Security Council Resolution 918, (1994) . 
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1.2.3 Apartheid 
 
The apartheid regime in South Africa was considered as a crime against the 
conscience and dignity of mankind which seriously disturbs international 
peace and security.35 The apartheid regime was a system of racial 
segregation where the rights of the majority black citizens were curtailed 
and the right of the minority white citizens protected. The regime 
empowered the government to declare harsh states of emergency and 
punish protesters.36  
The Council condemned the abhorrent policies of apartheid and measures 
taken by the government to enforce and extend those polices beyond its 
borders. It was also convinced that the situation resulting from the 
continued application of the apartheid policies and the constant buildup of 
the South African military and police force constituted a potential threat to 
international peace and security37. 
The protest against the regime sparked violence in the country leading to 
large-scale killings, banishment, imprisonment and torture. The Council in 
an effort to end this abhorrent regime placed an arms embargo on South 
Africa by calling upon member states to cease the sale and shipment of 
equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms 
and ammunition to South Africa.38 
  
                                                          
35 Security Council Resolution 392, (1976). 
36 http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html, accessed on the 22nd January 2013 
@ 11:45pm. 
37 Security Council Resolution 282, (1970) 
38 Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 182, (1963). 
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1.2.4 Seizure of power from a democratically elected government 
 
The military coup in Haiti ousted the freely elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
on the 30th September 1991.  
The situation in Haiti was described as a humanitarian crises including 
mass displacement of population, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, 
illegal detentions, abductions, rape and enforced disappearances. The 
situation was determined to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security.39 The Council placed a trade embargo on Haiti which was to last 
until the legitimate government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was re-
instated40 
Sanctions were imposed on Haiti ranging from a no-fly zone, lack of entry 
into member states of major participants of the coup and those acting on 
behalf of the military, freezing of assets belonging to the Haiti government, 
trade and an arms embargo.41  
In Sierra-Leone, the elected President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was 
overthrown by a group of soldiers known as the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council on the 25th May 1997.  
The Council condemned the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra 
Leone following the military coup, the deteriorating humanitarian 
conditions in that country, and the consequences to neighbouring 
countries42 
The Council determined that the situation in Sierra Leon constituted a 
threat to international peace and security after taking into consideration 
                                                          
39 Security Council Resolution 841, (1993). 
40 Security Council Resolution 841, (1993). 
41 Security Council Resolution 917, (1994). 
42 Security Council Resolution 1132, (1997). 
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the fact that the military junta had not taken steps to allow the restoration 
of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional 
order.  
The Council demanded that the military junta take immediate steps to 
relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the 
democratically elected Government and a return to constitutional order 
and also placed an arms embargo on Sierra Leone43 
1.2.4 Serious humanitarian crises 
 
Most situations leading to a threat to international peace and security are 
associated with serious humanitarian crises which are usually associated 
with gross violations of humanitarian law.  
The situation in Haiti was described as constituting a humanitarian crisis 
including mass displacement of the population thereby posing a threats to 
international peace and security.44 
In Haiti’s case two major factors influenced the Council’s determination of 
the situation as a threat to international peace and security. The first factor 
was the seizure of the power from the democratically elected government 
of President Aristide while the second was the serious humanitarian crises 
in the country.45 
In Rwanda, the Council was concerned at the magnitude of human suffering 
caused by the conflict and stated that the continued situation constitute a 
threat to international peace and security.46  
                                                          
43 Security Council Resolution 1132, (1997). 
44 Security Council Resolution 841, (1993). 
45 Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, (2007), 100-101. 
46 Security Council Resolution 918, (1994). 
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Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter the Council placed an arms 
embargo on Rwanda. In resolution 925, the Council stated that internal 
displacement of some 1.5 million Rwandans facing starvation and disease 
and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries constituted a 
humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions. To address this serious 
violation of humanitarian law the Council established the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute violators.47 
1.2.5 Genocide 
 
Genocide is the deliberate and systematic destruction, in whole or in part, 
of an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group.48 It is a violation of 
humanitarian law. 
The genocide by the Hutus of the Tutsis broke at the beginning of April 
1994. The Council stated in resolution 918, that the killing of members of 
an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or 
in part, constituted a crime punishable under international law 
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution 
of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace 
Persuaded that the establishment of an international tribunal for the 
prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and the other above-
mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will ensure that 
                                                          
47 Security Council Resolution 955, (1994).  
48 Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
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such violations are halted and effectively redressed the Council established 
an International Tribunal for Rwanda.49  
In the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, conflict between the three main 
ethnic groups, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, resulted in genocide 
committed by the Serbs against the Muslims in Bosnia.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of several small countries that emerged from 
the break-up of Yugoslavia, was mostly a Muslim country with minority of 
its population being Serbs.  The Serbs started killing the Muslims with the 
intention of erasing them completely. This was labelled as ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
and included mass shootings, forced repopulation of entire towns, and 
confinement in make-shift concentration camps for men and boys. The 
Serbs also terrorized Muslim families into fleeing their villages by using 
rape as a weapon against women and girls.   
The U.N. responded by imposing economic sanctions on Bosnia and also 
deployed its troops to protect the distribution of food and medicine to 
dispossessed Muslims.50 
The Council determined that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
constituted a threat to international peace and security.51 Acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter the Council placed a trade embargo on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.52 It also gave a directive that member state should not 
make financial aid available to the State.53 
                                                          
49 Security Council Resolution 955, (1994). 
50 http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/bosnia.htm, accessed on the 24th of January 2013 @ 
3pm. 
51 Security Council Resolution 757, (1992). 
52 Paragraph 4, Security Council Resolution 757, (1992). 
53 Paragraph 5, Security Council Resolution 757, (1992). 
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It can be deduced from the instances above that the Council usually 
determine cases that involve serious human suffering as internal armed 
conflict.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 THE ARAB SPRING CONFLICTS 
2.1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
2011 was a year of protest, crises and conflicts in the Middle East and 
North Africa. This was a huge change because the citizens of these region 
have been known to conform to order without challenging or questioning 
their leaders. After so many years of oppression the people took to the 
streets to demand a long overdue change and nothing could stop them not 
even the violence meted out to them by the security forces.54 
The media played a huge role in the freedom fight by revealing the gross 
cases of crime against humanity to the whole world. These acts made their 
struggle known to all thereby gaining the attention of the international 
community.55 
2.2 THE TUNISIAN  REVOLUTION (JASMINE REVOLUTION) 
2.2.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Tunisia gained its independence in 1956 and Habib Bourguiba was its first 
prime minister.56 In 1987, Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali took over the 
                                                          
54Amnesty International, Year of Rebellion the State of Human Rights In the Middle East and North Africa, 
(2012), 1, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE01/001/2012 accessed on the 18th of April 2012 @ 
2:00pm. 
55 Vivienne Walt,” Tunisia’s Nervous Neighbors Watch the Jasmine Revolution” in Time International (Atlantic 
edition), Vol 177 Issue 4 (2011), 12-17, http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.ujlink.uj.ac.za/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=63594434&site=ehost-
live&scope=site, accessed on 18th of April 2012 @ 2:30pm.  
56 Hanley Delinda, “Reflection on the Jasmine Revolution”, in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 
(2011), 
http://0search.ebscohost.com.ujlink.uj.ac.za/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=59412298&site=ehost-
live&scope=site, accessed on 18th of April 2012 @ 2:30pm.  
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government in a bloodless coup and became the president of Tunisia57 and 
his regime lasted for 24 years.58 
During Ben Ali’s initial years as a dictator, he provided free education to its 
citizens, protected the rights of women and eradicated Islamic extremism. 
59  He also promoted tourism thereby growing Tunisia’s economy.60 All 
these were done to relieve just enough social pressure to avoid discontent 
from building up to a point that would destabilize the country.61 
But when Tunisia’s economy slowed in 2008, the silent agreement between 
the government and the people began to fall apart. The free education 
policies also turned out to create more problems than solutions as most 
citizens who benefited from this policy could not gain employment.62  
The grim situation in Tunisia was further complicated with the high level of 
corruption in the government and the difficulties of migration to 
neighbouring countries.63 
 
  
                                                          
57 Mohammed Hassan, “The Cause of the Tunisian Revolution Go Well Beyond Ben Ali and His Party” in 
Investig’action-(Michel Collon’s Collum), 22 Feburary 2011 http://www.michelcollon.info/Mohamed-Hassan-
The-causes-of-the.html?lang=fr, accessed on the 21st of April 2012, @ 12:40pm.  
58How a fruit Seller Caused Revolution in Tunisia, CNN World, 16th January 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-
01-16/world/tunisia.fruit.seller.bouazizi_1_tunisian-history-street-vendor-police-officer?_s=PM:WORLD, 
accessed on the 21st of April 2012 @ 1:00pm.. 
59Vivienne Walt,” Tunisia’s Nervous Neighbors Watch the Jasmine Revolution” in Time International 
(Atlantic edition), Vol 177 Issue 4 (2011), 12-17, http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.ujlink.uj.ac.za/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=63594434&site=ehost-
live&scope=site, accessed on 18th of April 2012 @ 2:30pm.. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63Ibid. 
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2.2.2 THE CAUSE OF THE REVOLUTION 
 
The conflicts that swept throughout Tunisia, leading to the deposing of 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, were instigated by the suicide of 
Mohammed Al Bouazizi in December.64 
Mohammed Al Bouazizi was a poor 26-year old Tunisian who could not 
secure employment after his college education. To support himself and his 
family, he became a street vendor selling vegetables. However his small 
business was halted by a police officer because he did not have the 
necessary legal permit to sell and his wares were seized. 65 
On December 17 2010, during a protest against the harsh conditions in 
Tunisia, Al Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of a government building. 
Though he battled for his life he eventually died after 18 days in the 
hospital.66 
Mohammed through his death became a martyr which the Tunisian’s youth 
could relate with. The lack of employment, the high cost of living and the 
corruption in Tunisia had its youth filled with frustration and they 
desperately wanted a change.67 
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Though the cause of Tunisia’s revolution can be directly linked to the death 
of Mohammed Al Bouazizi, there were other causes of the revolution.   
These causes were corruption, unemployment and lack of press freedom; 
 Corruption. The President and his family enriched themselves 
despite the high rate of poverty and inflation in the country. The level 
of corruption became intolerable to the people and they decided to 
demand a change.68  
 Unemployment. Many of the youths who benefited from the free 
education could not find jobs after graduating from college. Basic 
amenities like food and shelter had become difficult to obtain due to 
the economy stagnation. 69 
 Lack of Press Freedom. Tunisia’s press was not an independent 
institution. Every story was censored by the government.70 
When the protests started in central Tunisia, the people’s demands were 
largely focused on socio-economic necessities.  However as the protest 
spread throughout the country so did the demands, from socio-economic 
needs to demands of freedom from corrupt leaders.71 
2.2.3 THE UPRISING 
 
The protest started out peacefully and the security forces responded with 
no force. However on the 24th of December 2010, the security forces fired 
live ammunitions at protesters, killing and injuring many.72 
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The security force used force indiscriminately against protesters and by-
standers that posed no threat to public safety. 73 The protesters’ right to life 
was disregarded and abused by the security force.74 
Though the Tunisian security force has a responsibility to maintain law and 
order and can employ the use of force to achieve this, it is apparent that 
they exceeded their responsibilities by employing force when there was no 
reason to and violated human rights law and standards.75 
The instances where state security forces can resort to force are limited to 
circumstances where activities genuinely threaten lives and public safety 
and the force must be proportionate to the threat.76  
The security officials prevented the injured from receiving medical 
attention and continued to fire shots at the injured thereby making it 
impossible for them to get required assistance.77 
Deposing President Ben Ali was accomplished at a heavy price. Many lives 
were lost and many more were injured in the uprising.78 According to the 
Amnesty International, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) has put the number of causalities at 147 in addition to 72 
people who died in prison in incidents linked to the unrest.79  
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2.2.4 THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
 
The situation in Tunisia was a mere civil resistance which lasted from the 
18th of December to Ben Ali's flight from the country on January 11th. The 
conflict did not qualify as an internal armed conflict as there was only one 
organized armed group which was the security forces of Tunisia. 
The crisis was timely ended because Ben Ali finally acceded to the demands 
of its people when he left the country. Though the security force used 
excessive force the crises did not degenerate to serious humanitarian 
crises. 
From the analysis of the various cases where the Council had interfered in 
internal conflict, it does so in cases of civil war, serious violation to 
humanitarian law and internal armed conflict. The situation in Tunisia did 
not fall into any of these categories hence did not warrant the input of the 
Council. 
It is also important to take into consideration that the primary 
responsibility to maintain law and order in a country is solely that of the 
country. In this case Tunisia was able to restore this order by the 
President’s timeously stepping down from power.  
2.3. EGYPT REVOLUTION 
2.3.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Ḥosni Mubarak became the president of Egypt in 1981 following the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat80 who was assassinated by Islamic extremists 
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who were not happy with his peace deal with Israel.81 When Mubarak 
became the president he imposed a state of emergency on the country.82 
He also established a security force that had the power to arrest and detain 
citizens without charge and for unlimited period of time. By virtue of the 
state of emergency demonstrations were banned and the press was placed 
on a tight leash.83  
2.3.2 THE CAUSE OF THE REVOLUTION 
 
The Egyptian revolution was inspired by the successful revolution in 
Tunisia.84 The revolution gave Egyptians the courage to demonstrate till 
Mubarak’s regime falls. Their complaints amongst others were the levels of 
government repression, poverty and inequality, unemployment, endemic 
corruption, police brutality and a lack of civil and political rights. 
Constitutional rights were placed on hold when Mubarak imposed a state of 
emergency in Egypt. In its place, military and special courts were 
established, oppositions were repressed, demonstrations restricted and 
censorship were legalized.  The emergency laws empowered the security 
force to commit serious human right violations such as torture and 
arbitrary detentions of government oppositions. 85  
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One of the main causes of the revolution was the growth of Egypt’s 
economy. Only the ruling elite benefited from this growth and the masses 
were left to suffer.86 
Other causes of the revolution were the level of poverty, unemployment, 
rampant corruption, police brutality and violation of civil and political 
rights. Inflation made it impossible for the masses to get basic needs like 
food.  In the face of this poverty, the ruling elite displayed the wealth they 
benefited from the economy flamboyantly.87 
During Mubarak’s regime there was a wide range of serious human rights 
violations, routine torture, random detention and mistreatment of 
detainees.88 
The final trigger for Egypt’s “25 January Revolution” was the Tunisian 
uprising. This gave political activists, the vast army of young unemployed 
and underemployed men and women, the workers, the victims of state 
repression and many others the confidence and courage to act. The fall of 
President Ben Ali and his regime within weeks, by peaceful 
demonstrations, made the Egyptians resolve to remove Mubarak from 
power.89   
2.3.3 THE UPRISING 
 
The Egyptian revolution, did not just happen, it was a result of series of 
protest that had been brewing over the years. For years, unrest had been 
bubbling under the surface, occasionally flaring into wide and large protest. 
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Though these uprisings were quelled, the country continued to witness 
almost on a daily basis strikes and sit-ins by workers, and smaller 
demonstrations by activists.90 Each public display of opposition punctured 
the heavy lid of repression, however harsh the state’s response.91 
The revolution Tunisia went through led to the overthrow of a tyrant and 
because it was televised worldwide as well as in Egypt, it propelled the 
Egyptians into demanding a change in their own country too.92 
The Egyptian Revolution began on 25th of January 2011. It was commenced 
with a series of street demonstrations, marches, and rallies, acts of civil 
disobedience, riots, labour strikes, and violent clashes throughout the 
country.93 
Protesters wanted a change from Mubarak’s regime which was polluted 
with corruption and police oppression. In its place they requested for 
democratic reforms of the political system94, the end of Emergency Law, 
freedom, justice, a responsive non-military government, and proper 
management of Egypt's resources.95 
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Egyptians took to the streets peacefully protesting against Mubarak’s 30-
year regime.96 They were however met with police brutality who 
responded with tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and live 
ammunition in an effort to prevent protesters from advancing towards the 
central squares where the protest were to take place97. 
During the uprising, protesters and journalist were arbitrarily arrested and 
detained. The journalists were released within few days of their arrests, but 
military courts sentenced many protesters to imprisonment.98  
In order to curb the uprising, the government shut down access to the 
internet and mobile phone networks and placed curfews in major cities.99 
The fundamental human rights of the people were grossly violated. The 
government violated the people’s right to freedom of assembly and this 
was not in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. According to the convention,100 any restrictions on these 
rights must be in accordance with the law and strictly necessary to 
preserve national security or public safety, public order, public health or 
morals, or protect the rights and freedoms of others.101 The people’s right 
to life protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
was also violated.102  
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All governments are responsible for ensuring public safety and maintaining 
public order, including using force when necessary and justified. When the 
security force resorts to use force to maintain public safety this must be 
governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality. The security 
forces in Egypt used excessive force while responding to the unrest. This is 
in contravention of international law and standards.103 
On Friday 11th of February 2011, Mubarak resigned due to a lot of pressure 
from the people’s protest and the army. This was highly celebrated by the 
people but this victory was tainted with the lives lost. The Ministry of 
Health and Population sources stated that about 846 persons died and 
6,467 others were injured in the uprising.104 
2.3.4 THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
 
The situation in Egypt is similar to that of Tunisia, as it does not qualify as 
an internal armed conflict warranting the intervention by the Council. The 
conflict was between the armed security forces and peaceful protesters.  
The duration of the conflict was 18days and the situation did not develop to 
a situation of a severe humanitarian crisis for the Council to intervene. The 
conflict abated when Mubarak resigned as the president of Egypt. 
From the analysis of the various cases where the Council had interfered in 
internal conflict, it does so in cases of civil war, serious violation to 
humanitarian law and internal armed conflict. The situation in Egypt did 
not fall into any of these categories hence did not warrant the input of the 
Council. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.1. LIBYA REVOLUTION/ CIVIL WAR 
3.1.1 THE BACKGROUND 
 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, after overthrowing King Idris I, became the 
ruler of Libya for 42years. He set up a political system which was defined as 
democracy but did not offer its citizen the freedom that came with a 
democratic system of government.105 
 Though it seems the Libyans should have a better quality of life than the 
Egyptians or Tunisians, because their country has large deposit of crude oil, 
the high rates of corruption, repression and suppression by their 
government did not allow this.106  
Draconian legislation outlawed dissent and the establishment of 
independent organizations. Hundreds of political prisoners were detained 
arbitrarily.107 An estimated number of 213 prisoners who have already 
served their sentences or been acquitted by Libyan courts remain 
imprisoned under Internal Security Agency orders.108 
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The Libyan citizenry were denied the fundamental freedom of expression, 
association and assembly. Demonstrations were considered illegal and 
organisers were often harassed, intimidated, arrested and tortured. 
Foreigners were often unjustly treated and the rights of women were not 
recognised and the minority tribes were marginalised.109  
3.1.2 THE UPRISING 
 
Following popular uprisings in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, protests 
against the government erupted in Libya on 15th February 2011.110 This 
was triggered by the arrest of Fathi Terbii, a human rights attorney who 
represented the relatives of more than 1,000 prisoners allegedly massacred 
by security forces in Tripoli.111 
When about 500 people stood outside the police headquarters to protest 
the police quickly resorted to violence, injuring dozens of the protesters 
and passers-by and arresting many others. The authorities blocked social 
media and restricted access to the internet and arrested activists suspected 
of planning the demonstration in an attempt to stifle the protest. Despite 
the government’s effort the protests spread like a wildfire.112  
In an effort to maintain their grip on power, the Libyan authorities arrested 
a number of activists and writers in the lead-up to the “Day of Rage.” 
Protests were met with tear gas, batons and live ammunitions. In the face 
of government brutality, the protesters’ determination to topple Colonel 
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Gaddafi grew. Anti-government protests escalated into armed clashes 
between the security forces and the protesters.113 
During the uprising, government forces repeatedly launched indiscriminate 
attacks with rockets into civilian-inhabited areas. The government laid 
thousands of antipersonnel and anti-vehicle landmines in various parts of 
Libya which will likely endanger civilians for many more years to come. 
In some areas, opponents of Colonel Gaddafi’s rule quickly overpowered 
the security forces and seized abandoned weapons. By mid-February, the 
unrest had rapidly evolved into an armed conflict. The civilian population 
increasingly suffered as the battle for Libya raged on.  Soon, opposition 
forces seized control of many towns and even the capital, Tripoli.114 
In Benghazi, the opposition established a coalition authority, the Interim 
Transitional National Council, which was soon after recognised by the 
international community under the leadership of the former Justice 
Minister, Mustafa Mohamed Abdeljalil.115 
After about eight months of conflict rife with war crimes and gross human 
rights violations, including indiscriminate attacks, extrajudicial executions, 
enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and torture, forces opposing 
Colonel Gaddafi was captured and killed him and the opposition 
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established territorial control over the whole of the country.116 The number 
of missing and dead remains unclear.117   
3.1.3 THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
  
The situation in Libya was very different from that of Tunisia and Egypt. 
Firstly the situation became an internal armed conflict by mid-February 
blowing up into a civil war. 
The war also lasted for a period of eight months as opposed to days in the 
case of Tunisia and Egypt. The situation developed into serious 
humanitarian crises hence the need for the Council to intervene. 
When a peaceful protest in Benghazi against the 42-year rule of Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi developed into internal armed conflict, the Council on 
the 26th February 2011 unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 (2011).118  
The Resolution regretted the situation of gross and systematic violation of 
human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators taking 
place in Libya. It also expressed deep concerns at the deaths of civilians, 
and rejects hostility and violence to the civilian population by the Libyan 
government.119 This situation was determined to be a crime against 
humanity.120 
The Council based the legitimacy of the resolution on the powers vested in 
it by virtue of Chapter VII, specifically under Article 41. It thus demanded a 
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cease fire in the country.121 It also referred the situation in Libya to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.122 The resolution gave the 
ICC jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 
Libya from 15th of February 2011.123 
Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations, the Council 
imposed sanctions on Libya in order to restore peace and security in the 
country. The first of these was the arms embargo which ordered all states 
to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and other 
related weapons to Libya.124 
 A travel ban was placed on Gaddhafi and some of his followers perceived 
to be the perpetrators of crimes against humanity.125 All funds belonging to 
the Libyan government within the territory of member states were 
frozen126 with the exception of those determined to be necessary for basic 
expenses.127 The resolution established a new sanctions committee whose 
sole purpose was to monitor the implementation of the sanctions imposed 
on Libya.128 
On 17th March 2011, as the fighting intensified in Libya and given the 
failure of its authorities to comply with the cease fire in Resolution 1970 
(2011), the Council adopted Resolution 1973 (2011) which imposed 
measures stated under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
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The Resolution reiterated that the situation in Libya continued to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security and acting under its 
powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council 
established a no-fly zone over Libya129 and the implementation of all 
necessary measures, short of foreign occupation to protect civilians.130 
The Resolution banned all flights except those for humanitarian and aid 
purposes in Libyan airspace in order to ensure that civilians and civilian-
populated areas could not be subjected to air attack.131 The Council 
authorised member states acting nationally or through a regional 
organization to enforce the no-fly zone.132 
On 24th of March 2011, NATO decided to enforce the Council mandated no-
fly zone over Libya and on the 31st of March 2011, NATO took sole 
command of the international effort over Libya and NATO’s  air and sea 
assets began taking military actions to protect civilians and civilian-
populated areas in Libya133. 
The strict enforcement of the arms embargo already imposed in resolution 
1970 (2011) was ensured by NATO.  
A ban was also placed on all aircraft registered in Libya or owned by Libyan 
nationals and companies unless the particular flight has been approved in 
advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing.134 
The Council, still actively seized of the matter in Libya, passed yet another 
resolution on the 16th of September 2011. Acting under Chapter VII of the 
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Charter and taking measures under Article 41, it established a United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)135.   The mandate of UNSMIL is 
to assist and support the Libyan national efforts to restore public security 
and order, promote the rule of law, promote reconciliation and promote 
human rights. 
The Council, taking note of the improved situation in Libya, limited the 
scope of the arms embargo placed on Libya in resolution 1970 (2011). 
Paragraph 13 of Resolution 2009 (2011) states that the embargo shall not 
apply to the transfer of arms into Libya which is intended solely for the 
security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities.  Embargo 
was also lifted on small weapons exported to Libya for the sole use of 
United Nations personnel. 
Based on the Council’s decision to keep under continuous review and to lift 
as appropriate and when circumstances permit, those measures and 
sanctions placed on Libya, on the 27th of October 2011 it passed resolution 
2016 which terminated the no-fly zone over Libya. 
 
3.2 SYRIA  
3.2.1 BACKGROUND 
 
President Bashar al-Assad assumed office on the 20th of June 2000 after the 
death of his father Hafez al-Assad who had taken over the presidency of 
Syria in the 1970 Corrective Revolution. The al-Assad family had ruled for 
40 years with an iron-fist under a state of emergency that severely 
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restricted and punished any dissent.136 The state of emergency gave the 
security police wide powers of arrest and detention, they were also free 
from prosecution regarding acts committed while carrying out their duties. 
During the regime the freedom of expression and assembly was largely 
repressed.137 
The uprising in Syria is part of a broader popular protest movement that 
has engulfed Middle East and North Africa, the Arab Spring, and led to the 
toppling of long-term regimes in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.138 The Syrians, 
who also faced hostility from their government and the violation of their 
human rights, like in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, could no longer keep silent 
and decided to demand a change.139 
3.2.1 CAUSE OF THE REVOLUTION 
 
A state of emergency had been enforced in Syria since 8 March 1963. This 
was declared through a military order on the basis of Legislative Decree No. 
51 of 1962, which set out the framework for a state of emergency. The 
emergency rule established special courts, censored communications and 
the media. Laws passed imposed extensive restrictions on the right to 
freedom of expression and criminalized public expression of opposition 
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and dissent. The state security apparatus was empowered to arrest 
arbitrarily.140  
The special court created was known as the Supreme State Security Court. 
It had jurisdiction to try those who dissent or are accused of offences 
against the state. The court was not impartial and was under the control of 
the executive branch of the government.141  
Unfair trials were very common before the Supreme State Security Court. 
Defendants had restricted access to their lawyers, did not have the right to 
appeal the decision of the court, and the courts accepted as evidence 
“confessions” allegedly extracted under torture.142 
The government passed laws which discriminated against women and  a 
minority group called the Kurds. Freedom of expression and association 
were strictly controlled. Genuine opposition political parties were not 
authorized and human rights NGOs could not obtain a licence to operate143. 
The legislation passed by the   regime led to  gross human rights violation 
and suffering of  the Syrian people. The frustration of the people reached a 
tipping point with the events of 6th of March 2010 and this lead to a 
revolution in the country 
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3.2.2 THE UPRISING 
 
Like the revolutions in the Arab states, the Syrian revolution started in a 
way that surprised even the Syrians themselves.144 None of these great 
changes in these Arab countries began with a call for a regime change. They 
all started by the masses demanding recognition of their basic human 
rights and an end to corruption145. 
The uprising in Syria started on 6th of March 2010, with the simple act of 
school children who sprayed slogans from the revolutions in Egypt that 
they had seen on television on walls. The local secret police soon arrested, 
detained and tortured the boys.146. 
The next day, security forces gunned down about 100 protesters mostly 
families of the missing, who had marched peacefully to the governor's 
house to demand the release of the children.147. 
The numbers of people killed by security forces fuelled the growing protest 
movement and their demands intensified from simple requests for reform 
to the all-out ousting of President Assad.  
Protesters set fire to the offices of the Baath Party and tore down the statue 
of Hafez al-Assad the former president, calling for freedom and an end to 
emergency rule.148 
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The uprising that started as a movement of angry, frustrated and oppressed 
protesters in Daraa spread in matters of weeks engulfed the country. 
Demonstrators were not limited to unemployed youth or farmers and small 
shopkeepers, but they included people from all works of society.149  
In some cases, the security forces merely used teargas or fired in the air to 
disperse the crowds. According to the Human Rights Watch there were 
several incidents when security forces opened fire directly at the protesters 
without giving advance warning or making any effort to disperse the 
protesters by non-lethal means. In other instances the security forces 
chased and continued to shoot at protesters as they fled.150 Injured 
protesters were prevented from receiving medical assistance. 
The security forces arbitrarily arrested thousands of people and many of 
them were tortured in detention, some were subjected to enforced 
disappearances and a number of them died in custody.151  
Syrian security forces moved into civilian populated areas in military 
vehicles, including tanks and armorer personnel carriers, under the cover 
of heavy gunfire. Checkpoints were imposed and snipers were positioned 
on rooftops restricting the movement of residents. In some places, the 
security forces imposed a full-out siege that lasted for several weeks, 
cutting off all means of communication and subjecting civilians to acute 
shortages of food, water, medicine, and other essential supplies.152 
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Initially, in the face of the growing protests and international 
condemnation, President Assad announced a number of reforms. These 
reforms however had no impact on the brutal crackdown, and were merely 
cosmetic. As a result, the legislative changes, from a government were 
distrusted and many of Syria’s people and fell far short of the protesters’ 
demands and so protests continued.153 
Many soldiers and officers that supported the fight for human rights 
defected from the army and security forces. The defecting soldiers have re-
organized themselves into revolutionary militias, calling themselves the 
Free Syrian Army and declared their decision to protect the Syrian 
people.154 
The level and gravity of the human rights violations committed in Syria 
amounted to crimes against humanity. The abuses were part of a 
widespread and systematic attack against civilians, carried out 
deliberately.155 
The use of force by state security forces acting in a law-enforcement 
capacity must comply with standards set out in international law however 
this was not the case in Syria.  A party to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights Syria has specific treaty obligations to respect the 
rights to life and security and to peaceful assembly. In most cases 
documented by Human Rights Watch, the use of force by security and law-
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enforcement officials were excessive and in clear violation of Syria’s 
international obligations.156  
Months of peaceful protest had failed to bring a change of government yet 
many lives had been lost or blighted by injury or abuse, leading some 
within the opposition to turn to violence, including the use of firearms to 
try to enforce change.157 Since March 2011, more than 4,000 people have 
been reportedly killed, tens of thousands arrested and more than 14,000 
reported to be in detention as a result of the uprising.158 
3.2.3 THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
The conflict in Syria as that of the one in Libya was an armed conflict 
between the governmental armed forces and non-governmental armed 
forces. Though the conflict did not start out as an armed conflict it 
progressed into one. 
On the 3rd of August 2011, the Council adopted a non-binding statement 
condemning the human rights violations by the Syrian government.159 
In October, the Council debated on a draft resolution which condemned the 
continued widespread and gross violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedom by the Syrian authorities.160  The resolution 
demanded that the Syrian government end all human right violations and 
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attacks against peaceful protesters and protect its population. It 
condemned all forms of violations by both the Syrian authorities and the 
opposition groups.  
The Council was to adopt all these measures under Article 42 of the United 
Nations Charter in order to restore peace to the region. Although 13 
members of the 15 members voted in favour of the draft resolution Russia 
and China vetoed it. This meant the resolution could not be adopted.161 
Russia had expressed concerns about the draft text, saying it feared the 
resolution would lead to the kind of military intervention and regime 
change seen in Libya where they perceived NATO   exceeded its mandate to 
protect civilians by bringing about a regime change.162 Russia also wanted 
the draft to adequately reflect the real state of affairs in Syria by 
condemning the actions of both parties to the conflict.163  
China's Ambassador Li Baodong voiced disappointment that the draft 
resolution did not incorporate amendments proposed by Russia, which 
China supported. He said the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of Syria must be fully respected.164 
More than a year after the Syria uprising started, the Security Council on 
14th of April 2012 unanimously adopted Resolution 2042 (2012).165  The 
resolution was devoid of all sanctions in reflecting Russia’s position that 
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stopping the violence in Syria was the primary goal, alongside avoiding 
external intervention.166 
The resolution condemned the widespread violations of human rights by 
the Syrian government and the armed groups. It also emphasised that all 
will be held accountable.167 
The Syrian government was encouraged to implements its commitment to 
cease troop movements towards population centres, cease all use of heavy 
weapons in such centres, and begin a pullback of military concentrations in 
and around population centres.168 The resolution called on the Syrian 
government and the armed opposition to cease all armed violence.169  
The Council authorized “30 unarmed military observers to liaise with the 
parties and to begin to report on the implementation of a full cessation of 
armed violence in all its forms by all parties”.170 
On the 21st of April 2012 the Council adopted Resolution 2043 (2012). The 
resolution established a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria 
(UNSMIS) comprising of 300 unarmed military observers.171  The mission’s 
mandate is to monitor cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all 
parties.172 
The Council intends to end violence in Syria without interfering with its 
sovereignty. The resolution according to the Russian representative was 
very reflective of the true situation of things in Syria.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION 
 
As thousands of people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria showed their 
hunger for the freedoms and rights enjoyed in other parts of the world, the 
Security Council response to this crises has been varied173 because the 
conflicts were different in nature.  
In Tunisia and Egypt, the Council did not interfere in the conflict because 
the situation did not constitute a threat to international peace. In contrast 
the Council took action in Libya because it was a threat to international 
peace. In Syria though, the Council did not act timely and its effort was 
truncated by the veto power exercised by Russia and China. 
Where the Council cannot or does not act swiftly enough, there is a 
tendency that parties to the crises will turn to unilateral decision to use 
force which will negate the whole purpose of the United Nations Charter.174 
In order to effectively perform its responsibilities the Council needs to 
concentrate more on prevention of conflicts. Though the responsibility to 
prevent conflicts lies primarily with states, the Council can support this by 
developing assistance and other efforts to help address the root cause of 
potential conflict, providing support for local initiatives to advance good 
governance, human rights and the rule of law, enhancing mediation efforts 
and other efforts to promote dialogue.175 
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The impulsive use of the veto power by permanent members of the Council 
is the principal obstacle to the effective performance of its responsibility to 
restore peace in cases where quick and decisive action is needed to stop or 
avert a significant humanitarian crisis. It is unacceptable that one veto can 
override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern as 
is the case in Syria. There is a possibility that needed action will be held 
hostage as a result of the personal interest of one or more of the permanent 
members.176 
To prevent this it is recommended that there is an agreed code of conduct 
for the use of the veto with respect to actions that are needed to stop or 
avert a significant humanitarian crisis. This means permanent members, in 
matters where its national interests are not involved, would not use its veto 
to obstruct the passage of what would otherwise be a majority 
resolution.177  
It is also recommended that the Council adopt the provision of Article 43 of 
the United Nations Charter to enable it to form its own military force which 
will enhance swift and immediate enforcement of its resolutions. This will 
also ensure that the military force acts within the mandate bestowed on it 
and not follow its own agenda.  
In situations where significant loss of human life occurs or is occurring it is 
important that the Council acts timely and swiftly to restore peace in such      
areas and its reactions should be consistent in all cases where 
circumstances are similar.  
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